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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ELMER HUBER and 
ROY HUBER, 
Plaintiffs and .Respondents, 
-vs.-
DEEP CREEK IRRIGATION 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
OLLIE W. JUSTICE, ORLAND 
COOK, DARV ALL COOK and 
BEN COOK, 
Defendants and Appellants, 
MOSBY IRRIGATION 
COMPANY, -
Intervenor. 
· Civil 
No. 8432 
Respondents' Brief 
NATURE OF CASE 
Appellants' Statement of Facts is adequate to pre-
sent the nature of the controversy, but is not acceptable to 
Respondents as a Statement of Facts. Appellants are 
confronted with the burden of showing that the evidence 
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will not sustain the trial court's findings. Appellants 
have ignored the evidence which sustains the trial court 
and have presented only the conflicting evidence. We will 
endeavor in the presentation of the argument to detail 
the evidence which supports the trial court's findings. 
We consider it sufficient to here state that Respond-
ents' predecessors were the first actual users of water 
as among these parties, and had a well-developed farm 
before any of Appellants came to that area. Respondents 
hold a certificate of appropriation from the Office of the 
State Engineer. That certificate on its face carries a pri-
ority seniority to the claimed rights of any of the Appel-
lants. The certificate was issued the 12th day of July, 
1926. Appellants admit on cross-examination that in the 
early 1930's a meeting was held to reach an understand-
ing on the use of water in Deep Creek. There is some evi-
dence that this understanding may have been reduced 
to writing, but no one produced a copy of it (R. 107). 
A.ll of the parties who testified concerning this agreement 
stated that the parties at that time agreed the Hubers 
(Respondents) and their predecessors, who were farthest 
downstream, had a right to the water until the water 
would not reach them in quantities sufficient to do them 
any good. When the waters ceased to reach the Hubers, 
then the upstream people could take it (R. 60, 115, 174, 
175, 108, 243). From the early 1930's until immediately 
prior to the suit the evidence is that the water was so used. 
Thus Respondents were admittedly the first users; they 
have a certificate of appropriation which gives them the 
senior right to the use of this water; and their right has 
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been recognized and honored by the Appellants for nearly 
thirty years. At least two of Appellants or their prede-
cessors admitted on cross-examination that they had 
always considered that the Hubers had the prior or senior 
right (R. 117, 174, 175). 
Appellants are attempting to effect a forfeiture by 
going behind the certificate of appropriation, and have 
the court declare that it was erroneously issued and to 
permit them to obtain a priority contrary to their paper 
rights and contrary to their usage during the past quar-
ter century. 
ARGUMENT 
1. THE CERTIFICATE OF APPROPRIA-
TION NOW OWNED BY RESPONDENTS 
IS VALID AND CORRECTLY REFLECTS 
THEIR WATER RIGHT. 
The Appellants challenge the trial court's conclusion 
that Respondents' Certificate of Appropriation grants to 
Respondents the senior right to the use of the waters of 
Deep Creek. They place their argument entirely upon 
the fact that the Judge drew an erroneous conclusion of 
law, to-wit, that the certificate can not be collaterally 
attacked. The problem really has two facets. The first 
involves the question of whether the record in the trial 
court discloses substantial compliance with the statutes 
so that the certificate was properly issued. An examina-
tion of this matter would assume arguendo that the trial 
court should have examined the problem of the proper 
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issuance of the certificate. The court received, pro forma, 
all of the evidence, but turned its decision upon the con-
clusion that certificates of appropriation, like patents to 
land, are not subject to collateral attack. This holding 
made it unnecessary for the court to go into the facts 
relating to the issuance of the certificate. We believe that 
this ruling was correct, but we also contend that even if 
we go behind the certificate, the facts show substantial 
compliance with the statutes. 
(a) THE COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT 
THE CERTIFICAE COULD NOT BE COL-
LATERALLY ATTACKED. 
There is no allegation or charge on the part of Ap-
pellants that there was fraud in the issuance of the cer-
tificate, or that there is any other ground for directly 
attacking it. Appellants simply ask the trial court in a 
collateral proceeding to examine everything that hap-
pened in the Office of the State Engineer from the date 
the application was filed in 1908 until the certificate of 
appropnation issued in 1926. There is one Utah case in 
which the Supreme Court states that certificates of 
appropriation on water are similar to patents to land, 
and that irregularities in the proceedings prior to the 
issuance of the patent or the certificate are cured by the 
iH~uance of the certificate. In the case of fraud or juris-
dictional error timely suits may be brought to set aside 
a patent thus improperly issued, but there is no author-
ity which will sustain the proposition that a patent or a 
certificah' can be collaterally attacked nearly thirty years 
4 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ma, after its issuance for mere irregularities in the Office of 
COJl. the State Engineer. 
ls t~ 
1l~ We submit that the case of Warren Irrigation Co. vs. 
lact1 Charlton, et al, 58 Utah 113, 197 P. 1030, is in point, and 
re~t that the trial court correctly applied it when it drew 
mnu the conclusion that Appellants had not made a showing 
l\an~ which would justify the trial court in impeaching the cer-
tificate of appropriation owned by Respondents. 
In that case the Supreme Court said: 
"In our opinion, the question presented here 
should be determined by the same rules and prin-
ciples which control in cases involving the effect 
given to patents issued for public land by the Land 
Department of the United States. [The court cites 
Moore v. Robbins, 96 U.S. 530, 24 L. Ed. 848, and 
Smelting Co. v. Kemp, 104 U. S. 636, 26 L. Ed. 875, 
and quotes with approval from each, and then 
says:] 
"At page 641 of 104 U. S. (26 L. Ed. 875), in 
speaking of the conclusiveness of a land patent as 
evidence, the court, speaking through Mr. Justice 
Field, says : 
'It is this unassailable character which gives 
to it its chief, indeed its only, value, as a 
means of quieting its possessor in the enjoy-
ment of the lands it embraces. If intruders 
upon them could compel him, in every suit for 
possession, to establish the validity of the 
action of the Land Department and the cor-
rectness_ of its ruling upon matters submitted 
to it, the patent, instead of being a means of 
peace and security, would subject his rights 
to constant and ruinous litigation.' 
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"See, also other cases cited by respondent: Welsh 
v. Callvert, et al, Land Commissioners, 34 Wash. 
250, 75 Pac. 871; Plummer v. Brown, 70 Cal. 544, 
12 Pac. 464; Steel v. Smelting Co., 106 U. S. 447, 
1 Sup. Ct. 389,27 L. Ed. 226. 
''As we understand the law applicable to this 
question, we are forced to the conclusion that the 
trial court committed no error in rejecting the evi-
dence offered to contradict the recitals contained 
in the certificate of appropriation.'' 
"\Vater law and mining law had common origins. 
Principles of law which have developed to govern one 
have been interchangeably cited to govern the other. In 
the case of the filing of mining claims, the cases are nu-
merous and unanimous in holding that all the irregulari-
ties which transpire after the original filing of the mining 
claim and through the issuance of patent, are cured by 
the issuance of patent. These are the cases cited by the 
Utah Supreme Court as noted above. See also United 
States v. Miner, 114 United States 233, 29 L. Ed. 110. 
There is no reason why this same rule should not 
apply to certificates of appropriation in water matters. 
The State Engineer is charged by statute with adminis-
tering the procedure for perfecting a water right. He is 
not merely a file clerk to rereiYe documents and hold them 
for later court review. He must at the outset prepare the 
forms to be used. He must examine an application and 
determine whether or not it is sufficiently detailed to meet 
the requirements of the statute. If he examines an appli-
cation and concludes that it is adequate, it is filed and the 
applicant relies on that decision when he goes forward 
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renu. 
with his appropriation. It would be a serious thing to 
permit a court thirty years later to re-examine the appli-
cation to appropriate, and to then rule that the State 
Engineer in the exercise of his statutory function in this 
regard erred in permitting the application to be filed. 
Each step taken by applicant has a similar problem 
in it. For exmnple, the statutes provide that an applica-
tion for an extension of time must be made in affidavit 
form. A particular applicant may apply for an extension 
and the showing he makes may not be properly notarized 
or may have other technical deficiencies which do not lit-
erally conform to the statRte. Nevertheless, the State 
Engineer accepts the affidavit, acts thereon and grants 
an extension of time. The applicant would reply upon the 
decision and proceed with the expenditure of money to 
complete his work and obtain his certificate. Again, it 
would seriously place a cloud of uncertainty on all water 
rights in the State if this court were to hold that thirty 
years later another water user could ask the court to go 
[Jnol behind the certificate of appropriation to review the 
1ttm. question of whether the affidavit for the extension was 
• adequate. The liberality of the courts in this regard is 
H~~ well demonstrated by two cases relating to extensions of 
iliem time for submitting proof. See Pool v. Utah County, 59 
r~ilie Utah 242, 202 P. 1096, and Re Application 7600, 63 Utah 
1 ana 311, 225 P. 605. 
Jl]~~~ 
ppli· Appellants here are asking the court to re-examine 
!ili~ the State Engineer's decision in a similar situation. The 
raf~ applicant was given an extension of time by order of the 
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State Engineer to the 15th day of June, 1923 (R. 287). 
Prior to the expiration of that time applicant applied for 
a further extension, but the requested extension would 
have extended the time beyond the end of the fourteen-
year period (R. 287). The State Engineer granted until 
July 31, 1923 ( R. 287). 
Within the time prescribed by the State Engineer 
(July 31, 1923) the applicant filed a proof of appropria-
tion. This is admitted by Appellants (Brief p. 7). The 
State Engineer considered the proof submitted to be ade-
quate for the purpose of holding applicant's priority, but 
returned it for additions and corrections (Def. Ex. 3). 
The corrections were made within the additional time 
allowed by the State Engineer, the proof was accepted, 
and the certificate issued (Ex. D). For the next 28 years 
nobody challenged it, and water was used with all of the 
parties recognizing the validity of the certificate and its 
priority (R. 60, 115, 117, 174, 175, 108, 243). 
This is not a case where there was a total failure to 
comply with the statute. Appellants simply ask the court 
in a collateral proceeding to examine the things which 
happened in the State Engineer's office and to determine 
that the State Engineer was in error in accepting the 
proof, because of deficiences. 'V e will argue in the next 
subdivision that the alleged deficiencies are not such that 
the State Engineer should in any event haYe been re-
versed, but we state here that this court ought not under 
the showing made by Appellants in this case, re-examine 
the decision reached by the State Engineer in 1923, in 
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which decision the State Engineer concluded that the 
proof submitted on time sufficiently complied with the 
statute, and permitted it to be filed. The holding of the 
trial court in this regard corresponds with the law as set 
forth by the Supreme Court in the Charlton case, supra, 
and its decision ought not to be disturbed. If we are 
sustained on this point, then sub-section (b) which fol-
lows becomes immaterial. 
(b) THE DEFICIENCIES IN THE PROOF 
WERE NOT SUCH AS TO CAUSE A LOSS 
OF PRIORITY, EVEN WERE THE 
COURT TO GO BEHIND THE CERTIFI-
CATE AND RE-EXAMINE THE PRO-
CEEDINGS BEFORE THE STATE ENGI-
NEER. 
It is admitted by appellants that applicant was 
granted an extension of time until July 31, 1923, within 
which to submit proof of appropriation (R. 287). (Brief 
p. 7) It likewise is admitted by Appellants that within 
the time required, Respondents' predecessor, Gerber, 
did file a proof of appropriation on a blank furnished by 
the State Engineer (Brief, p. 7). This proof was intro-
duced in evidence as part of the file on Certificate No. 
1477, as Exhibit 3 (R. 153). The proof was received by 
the State Engineer on the 30th day of July, 1923 (asap-
pellants admit at page 7 of their brief), which was prior 
to the expiration of the time for submitting proof. 
~~r In challenging the adequacy of the proof, Appellants 
nin~ note on page 7 of their brief that the proof was filed ap-
1, in parently without being sworn to on July 30, 1923. The rec-
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ord stands uncontradicted to the effect that the practice 
of the State Engineer was in 1923, and now is, to have 
the proof of appropriation submitted unsigned, the pur-
pose apparently being to have the affidavits by the 
engineers, witnesses and appropriators await the final 
corrections. Engineer Colton testified that this was and 
is the practice (R. 275). There is a letter dated March 5, 
1924, which was a part of Exhibit 3, in which the State 
Engineer directed applicants to sign the affidavits and 
certificates after "the corrections required have been 
made.'' Thus, the failure of the applicants to sign and 
swear to the proof at the time it was originally filed is in 
accordance with the practice which has prevailed in the 
Office of the State Engineer for thirty years and was in 
accordance with the State Engineer's instructions. 
Appellants next note that the $1.00 filing fee was paid 
in time, and on July 25, 1923; but they say that the proof 
vvas fatally defective, because the $5.00 fee for examin-
ing and approving the proof was not filed before July 31st 
-the date on which proof of appropriation was due. 
Appellants do not cite any authority for their contention 
that the $5 examination fee had to be paid when the proof 
is filed, nor do they even note the statutes relating to fees. 
Apparently the statute then in effect was Title 31, Com-
piled Laws of Utah, 1917. Section 2516 specified the fees 
of the State Engineer, and proYided "The State Engineer 
shall collect the following fees * * * For examining map, 
profile nnd drawings that are part of the proof of appro-
priation, $5.00.'' 
10 
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n tn~ 
It will be noted that Section 2516 does not provide 
that this $5.00 fee must be paid at the time the proof of 
appropriation is filed, nor does the statute even state 
that the fees must be paid in advance of the rendering of 
the service. It should be noted that the opening section 
(2510) of that chapter specifiically requires the fees of 
certain state officers "to be collected in advance," but 
enumerated officers do not include the State Engineer. 
Thus, there is no statutory authority to support the ar-
gument made by appellants. The filing fee was paid in 
advance, to-wit, on July 25th. This was six days prior to 
the date proof was due. The fee for examining the proof 
maps was also paid before the proof maps were examined, 
because, as is admitted by Appellants, this $5.00 fee was 
paid October 20th when the proof maps were filed. 
There is considerable authority to the effect that 
even had there been a failure to pay the filing fee, it would 
not have voided the application, nor lost the priority. 
Mining laws generally require that the notice of location 
be recorded with the County Recorder. There have been 
cases in which the locator tendered the notice of location 
for recordation, the recorder accepted the same without 
requesting the fee. Thereafter a conflicting claimant 
asserted that the failure to pay the fee rendered the prior 
claim void. The courts under such situations have ruled 
that the failure of the Recorder to collect the Recording 
fee would not render the mining claim void. See Shepard 
v. Murphy, 26 Colo. 350, 58 P. 588, where the court said: 
''The matter of the time of payment of fees was 
exclusively one between that official and the plain-
11 
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tiff, and the officer, if he saw fit, might waive that 
requirement.'' 
We thus here have a situation where the filing fee 
was paid on time and the statute on the fee for examining 
the proof does not specify the time when the same should 
be paid. For all that appears from the statute, it was 
paid on time. Appellants' contention that both fees had 
to be paid at the time the proof was submitted is not sup-
ported by any statutory language, or any other authority. 
It is simply an unsupported conclusion drawn by the 
Appellants. They admit on page 7 that both fees were 
paid, and we deny that either fee was paid late. But in 
any event, the State Engineer accepted the proof and 
under the authority of Shepard v. Murphy, supra, even 
a total failure to pay the fee would not lose to Respond-
ents their priority. 
We respectfully submit that there is no merit to Ap-
pellants' position in regard to the payment of fees. 
The next ground upon which the certificate of appro-
priation is challenged is that complete maps, plans and 
profiles were not filed with the proof. The present statute 
73-3-16, DCA 1953, expressly gives the State Engineer 
the power to waive proof maps and drawings. It is ad-
mitted that the proof itself was filed July 30, 1923; that 
time for submitting proof did not expire until the follow-
ing day (Appellants' brief page 7). The record indicates 
that complete proof maps were not submitted at that time. 
The entire file relating to Certificate 1477 was tendered 
as defendants' Exhibit 3, but since it was the State En-
12 
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gineer's file, the State Engineer was permitted to with-
draw it, and the parties were given permission to photo-
stat any particular document. The attorneys for the par-
ties read substantial portions of the file into the record 
and stipulated regarding the same so that very little of 
the file was in fact photostated. We note this, because 
much of the detail on this particular file is only given by 
way of conclusion by counsel in their stating of the mat-
ter into the record. The trial court finally concluded that 
the whole file should be rejected, because this was a col-
lateral attack on the certificate, so the file, while proffered 
in evidence and received pro forma was finally excluded 
by the court's judgment and withdrawn by the State 
Engineer. 
Part of the lands covered by Certificate No. 1477 
were included in the proof maps previously filed by the 
White Rocks Irrigation Company under its Certificate 
No. 644 (R. 282). Mr. Colton testified that it is custom-
ary to adopt these maps by reference and not to resubmit 
the same maps (R. 282). We, therefore, on July 30th, one 
day before time for submitting proof had expired, had 
paid the $1.00 filing fee for filing proofs. (Appellants' 
brief 7); had filed a proof of appropriation on the blank 
furnished b ythe State Engineer and in the form required 
by the State Engineer's rules and regulations; and finally 
reference had been made in the proof to the proof maps 
already on file under the White Rocks application 
(R. 282). The State Engineer accepted the proof and 
thereafter requested the additional proof maps and water 
measurements. 
13 
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The State Engineer concluded that the proof :filed 
July 30th was adequate to avoid a forfeiture of the water 
right, and that the compliance with each of his other 
1·equests was also timely and adequate, and he, therefore, 
issued his certificate of appropriation (Ex. D). We be-
lieve that there was a substantial compliance with the 
statute, and that this court should not hold that the State 
Engineer erred in so ruling. 
Perhaps one other thing should be noted in this re-
gard. Everybody admits that Gerber was the first 
appropriator among these parties. He filed his applica-
tion in 1908 (Ex. D). His son was on the land in 1914 
(R. :31). By 1922 his works were completed and various 
witnesses indicated that he was growing crops of corn 
and hay (R. 37, 132). Thus, Gerber had a well-established 
farm before any of these other parties entered upon the 
scene. They knew his ranch was there, and that they 
were attempting to establish a secondary right. Appel-
lant Justice did not file his application until June 16, 1922 
(Ex. F). Benjamin Cook filed his application :Jiarch 19, 
1924 (Ex. E). The Eli Smith application was filed Feb-
ruary 14, 1927 (Ex. C). The Justice application was 
lapsed, as will be noted below. Thus, all of these parties 
came on to the stream and started their homesteads 
aftL•r the Gerber Ranch was well established, and they are 
here attempting to prevail upon this court to declare a 
forfeiture which will permit them to "leap frog" over the 
priority of the Hubers. The law abhores a forfeiture, 
nnd there is little equity in the position they here press. 
Had the State Engineer on July 30, 1923, rejected Ger-
14 
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her's proof as being inadequate and not in compliance 
with the statute, Gerber being thus warned, could have 
applied for reinstatement and could still have had a pri-
ority date immediately after July 30, 1923. The law has 
never required and did not then require the applicant to 
start over. It merely caused the postponement of the pri-
ority date from the date of the original application to the 
date when the proof was made. The statute is quoted on 
pages 8 and 9 of Appellants' brief, and is Section 55, 
Chapter 67, Laws of Utah, 1919. By October 20, 1923, 
when the proof maps came in and the $5.00 examining 
fee was paid, the proof met all requirements of the stat-
ute, even though minor corrections were made thereafter, 
and an October 20, 1923, priority date would be ahead of 
all these Appellants. 
The file on the Ollie Justice right was introduced in 
evidence and then withdrawn by the State Engineer. 
However, his application 9059 was introduced and still 
remains in the file as Exhibit F. It shows on its face that 
it was lapsed and then reinstated with its original pri-
ority date. The parties stipulated extensively concerning 
the history of this application, beginning at page 255 of 
the record. The entire file on the Ollie Justice right is 
designated Exhibit L, and it was received in evidence 
(R. 55). An application for an extension of time for sub-
mitting proof is stamped as having been received October 
17, 1931, and there is endorsed on the back thereof ''Time 
within which proof of appropriation is due is hereby ex-
tended to November 10, 1932. '' That extension was dated 
October 19, 1931, and was endorsed by George Bacon, 
15 
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State Engineer (R. 55). The file then shows an instru-
ment bearing date of September 12, 1932. It is addressed 
to Mr. Ollie W. Justice, in care of Leon P. Christensen, 
Vernal, Utah, and it notifies the addressee that proof 
would be due November 10, 1932. There is then a request 
for an extension of time which is stamped as having been 
received by the State Engineer November 14, 1932. The 
request is signed by Ollie W. Justice and notarized by 
Leon P. Christensen (R. 56). There is also a letter of 
transmittal signed by Leon P. Christensen, dated 
November 7, 1932, and it is stamped as having been 
received November 14, 1932 (R. 56). Thus, the re-
quest for an extension of time was received four 
days late. The State Engineer lapsed the applica-
tion, and there is considerable correspondence between 
the State Engineer, Mr. 0. W. Justice and Attorney Hugh 
Colton, who states in his letters that he represented Mr. 
Justice as to the propriety of the State Engineer lapsing 
the application (R. 56). Letters were exchanged until 
January 16, 1933, but it was stipulated that the file does 
not reflect that any appeal was taken (R. 57). The file 
fails to show that anything else transpired until May 28, 
1940, and Appellants so stipulated (R. 57). A different 
State Engineer accepted an affidavit from Mr. Justice on 
May 28, 1940. The State Engineer, on August 14, 1940, 
then stated: 
''After giving careful study to this situation, I 
am convinced that in 1932 the State Engineer did 
not comply with the law in sending notice of proof 
due to Mr. Christensen and not to the applicant. 
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Hud 
Since the law was not complied with as to notice, 
it is my opinion that the lapsing of the application 
because proof was not made, nor a request for an 
extension submitted within the time allowed, was 
contrary to law. I have, therefore, this date rein-
stated your application as of the original priority, 
and extended to and including October 25, 1941, 
the time in which appropriation may be sub-
mitted." (R. 57-58) 
The file does not reflect that in granting the extension 
to October 25, 1941, any notice was published of a pro-
posal on the part of the State Engineer to extend the time 
for submitting proof beyond the fourteen-year period 
(R. 58). It is this particular thing that Appellants are 
complaining about on the Gerbers, to-wit, that the State 
Engineer permitted proof maps and amendments of the 
proof on October 20th, which was some fifty days after 
the expiration of the fourteen-year period fixed by stat-
ute. The statute provided then, and still does, that the 
State Engineer could grant extensions of time up to 14 
. years ( simply on affidavit, but after fourteen years only 
after publication of notice (Section 73-3-12 UCA 1953). 
We thus have a situation where one State Engineer 
reached the conclusion that proof had not been submitted 
when due on November 10, 1932; that the application re-
questing an extension of time filed November 14, 1932, 
was four days late, and that the application should be 
lapsed. The correspondence in the file adequately reflects 
that Justice had notice of the State Engineer's decision. 
The statute says this decision shall be final unless 
appealed (Sec. 73-3-12). He did not within the sixty days 
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required by Section 73-3-14, DCA 1953, file his appeal 
with the District Court, nor did he do anything else except 
argue for a few months with the State Engineer. He let 
eight years go by. He also let the fourteen-year period 
expire. He then induced a new State Engineer to reverse 
the decision of his predecessor and reinstate the applica-
tion with a 1922 priority. He is not aided here, as we are, 
by the issuance of a certificate, because even as of this 
date Justice has not obtained a certificate of appropria-
tion. He apparently wants the court to hold that the State 
Engineer for him could exceed the fourteen-year period; 
that he could ignore the statute, making decisions of the 
State Engineer binding upon him, unless within sixty 
days after notice he appeals, and he wants the court to 
uphold the quasi-judicial decision of the State Engineer 
in 1940, reversing the previous engineer's decision, and 
reinstating his application in 1922. On the other hand, 
where the Gerber's filing is concerned, Justice wants the 
technical letter of the law obeyed, wants the State Engi-
neer to be treated as a file clerk, with no discretion or 
judgment in determining the adequacies of a proof of 
appropriation, wants the court to look behind a certificate 
of appropriation to irregularities not nearly so glaring 
or serious as are his own and to bring down the priority 
of the Gerber right. 
All of the parties admit, and, of course, they must 
do so, that the filing fees, approval fees, proof maps and 
proof forms were on file by October :2~1, 1923 (App. brief 
p. 7). Even if the court were to hold that Gerber lost 
his priority by reason of the technical deficiences in his 
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proof which was filed on. time, his priority would only be 
brought down to October 20, 1923. This is ahead of all 
of the certificates of all of the defendants, except Jus-
tice, as shown by their certificates and applications (Ex. 
C, D & F), and is also ahead of 1Ir. Justice, whose prior-
ity certainly would have to be brought down by reason of 
the above history, if the same legal theory is applied. In 
this regard, the court should bear in mind that we are not 
collaterally attacking a certificate in the case of Mr. Jus-
tice. He has no certificate. He failed to appeal the State 
Engineer's decision, lapsing his application, and sat idle 
for eight years when a new State Engineer, without statu-
tory authority and without following the statutory pro-
ceedings reinstated his application and granted him a 
proof date beyond the fourteen-year period. Thus, under 
any view of the case the right of the Respondents is ahead 
of the rights of the Appellants, and the decree was prop-
erly entered. 
2. THE EVIDENCE ADEQUATELY SUP-
PORTS THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS 
THAT RESPONDENTS HAVE NOT LOST 
THEIR WATER BY ADVERSE USE. 
Appellants assert that the evidence shows that 
Hubers abandoned their water and lost it by adverse pos-
session to appellants. They also assert that a contract 
was made, whereby Respondents yielded their rights. 
The trial court found in favor of the Respondents, and 
Appellants have the burden of showing that there is no 
evidence to sustain the findings. We submit that the trial 
court is adequately supported by the evidence. Every 
19 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
witness who testified admitted that the Huber right has 
had its water and has been treated as the prior right on 
the stream. For the convenience of the court, we detail 
some of that evidence : 
ELI SMITH - Witness for Appellant: 
Mr. Smith testified (R. 115) that a meeting was held 
by all the users and that "it seems to me that we did 
decide that as long as the water would reach Hubers, why, 
we'd let it alone. After it got down to about a second-foot, 
then we'd take the water above.'' On cross-examination 
he was asked a question, "and you always recognized that 
they (Hubers) had a right superior to yours in the 
stream? A. I did. Q. And whenever the Hubers would 
insist upon the water coming down, they didn't have to 
take your dam out, because you would? A. That is right. 
Q. And you did release it to them whenever they would 
request you to do it? A. I did. Q. And over these years 
there were occasions when they would request you to re-
move the dam and let the water down? A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And when they made those requests you took your 
dams out and turned the water down to them? A. I did.'' 
He also again stated on cross-examination (R. 117) 
that as long as the water would reach the Hubers the 
parties agreed at a meeting that Smith (the witness), Jus-
tice and Cook would leave the water alone. 
Appellant CooK : 
Appellant Cook testified on direct examination (R. 
1656) that his father shut the water off dry and took it 
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ihas all when a man named Parry, who has a diligence right 
:hton prior to any of these parties, took the water at a point 
uet~ upstream. However, on cross-examination (R. 173), he 
testified that they didn't exactly watch to determine when 
Parry dammed off the water, "but when the water got 
low enough in the ditch to not reach Hubers we took it.'' 
l~nehl "Q. But as long as the water would reach Hubers, you 
ieilin didn't dam it off dry~ A. No." The witness said he 
1,~1, did not claim a better priority than Hubers (R. 173}, and 
a-fool that he knew priorities were controlled by filings with the 
nati~n State Engineer. At page 174 of the Record he again 
rlilia! admitted that he recognized the Huber right as the ear-
n ilie liest filing "but not for six second-feet." He was then 
w~rua asked, '' Q. And you recognized it to the extent of never 
mto trying to shut the stream off dry until after the time did 
ri~h!. arrive during the season when the stream would not 
wociJ reach the Hubers~ A. Yes." 
yMri 
t~ re· 
r,!ir. 
your 
rud" 
llii 
1ilie 
Jus· 
(B. 
dt 
Mr. Cook was then asked (R. 187): "Q. Now the sit-
uation that exists here, is that you people have always 
recognized that when the flow of water was reaching the 
Hubers in a quantity big enough to do them any good, 
that they had the prior right to take it~ A. We tried to 
recognize that until the other waters from the other 
sources came in-until the water from Mosby Mountain 
came in. Q. Then there was a time when you people de-
cided that the streams wouldn't get down Deep Creek in 
a large enough quantity to do the Hubers any good, so 
you put your tight dam in. That is correct isn't it~ 
A. Yes.'' 
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By way of explanation it should be noted that water 
of Mosby Irrigation Company was placed in Deep Creek 
and commingled with the Deep Creek water. This was 
done only in recent years, and Mr. Cook's statement that 
they recognized the Huber right as being prior "until 
the other water came in,'' had reference to this Mosby 
water, as his answers indicate. 
We thus have express admissions from Eli Smith, 
who was the owner of one of the water rights, and Mr. 
Cook, who is the owner of another of those rights, that 
both recognized that Hubers had the best priority, and 
that the upstream users would not take the water until 
the stream dropped to a point where the flow was not 
large enough to do the Hubers any good. 
Appellant JusTICE: 
Appellant Justice admits that he moved onto his 
land in 1923, and first raised a crop (R. 196). He admitted 
on cross-examination (R. 213) that he told the Hubers 
that "they might haYe a priority to the water, but it 
wasn't theirs to do as they pleased with.'' He admits 
on page 219 that he remembers a ~Ir. Burton from the 
Stn te Engineer's office coming to his land to make a 
field examination, and on cross-examination at R. 237, 
he admits that he may haYe told I\Ir. Burton that the 
users had had a meeting in the early 1930's in which the 
understanding ·was reached "that if there were water 
enough to reach the Huber ranch, none would be diYerted 
by the upper users until the flow at this ranch had reached 
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Iter 6 second-feet. When the water recedes, so that delivery 
ree( can not be made to Huber, each owner of the upper rights 
W!! may take all that reaches his point of diversion, provided 
iliat he does not exceed his right." Mr. Justice said that this 
unhl agreement had been honored by all until recent years, 
lo!o: when Cook began to use water any time that it is at his 
point of diversion." 
,ilia! 
,anu 
unill 
He was asked again at R. 242 whether or not he 
didn't think the Hubers had a better priority. He said 
he didn't because, "no man could obtain a water right 
without the beneficial use thereof." At page 243 of the 
Record he said: ''I insisted that they didn't have the 
right to run a lot of water down that channel when they 
couldn't get no beneficial use out of it. Q. When the 
amount of water wasn't enough to do them any good~ A. 
Yes sir. Q. When that would occur, the stream was so low 
that they couldn't get any use out of it, then you consid-
l nil ered you had a right to take the water at your dam~ A. 
[tted That was my theory.'' 
iller~ 
ut it 
!:niti 
kea 
He admits at R. 244 that he always had trouble with 
the Hubers; that the Hubers came up every year for 
their water. Specifically, he said, "No, I wouldn't deny 
that they haven't been up there every year." At page 
245 he admits that the Hubers took out his dams. 
Witness BuRTON : 
The parties stipulated that if Witness Burton from 
the Office of the State Engineer were called as a witness 
he would testify in accordance with a report which he 
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filed, and which is set out in full at R. 258 and 259. In 
this statement he indicated that Mr. Justice told him of 
an agreement. His language is as follows : 
"The first appropriation from Deep Creek was 
Application No. 1713 by Moroni Gerber, later 
transferred to a Mr. Huber. Under this right the 
water is used approximately 1 mile east and 1 mile 
south of LaPoint. During low water or seasons 
of small run-off, the water will not reach the 
Huber areas. l\1any years ago a dispute arose be-
tween the Huber right and the rights upstream, 
and a meeting was held at which a verbal agree-
ment was reached. This understanding provided 
that if there were water enough to reach the Huber 
ranch, none would be diverted by the upper users 
until the flow at this ranch had reached 6 second-
feet. When the water recedes so that delivery can-
not be made to Huber, each owner of the upper 
rights may take all that reaches this point of diver-
sion, provided he does not exceed his right. Mr. 
Justice said that this agreement had been honored 
by all until recent years when Cook began to use 
water any time that it is at his points of di-
version.'' 
It was in reference to this statement that l\Ir. Justice 
was asked whether or not he may haYe given ~Ir. Burton 
the information recited by l\1r. Burton, and :\Ir. Justice 
admitted that he may haYe done so (R. 237). 
We thus, respectfully submit that all of the Appel-
lants have themselves admitted that they haYe treated 
the Huber right as the prior right; that they had an 
agreement that they would not take any of the water in 
the spring before high water, if (a) the water was reach-
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mol 
ing the Huber Ranch, and (b) the amount at the Huber 
Ranch was less than 6 c.f.s. During high water they 
would take water according to their rights, but when the 
stream receded so that there was not six c.f.s. at the 
Huber Ranch, all of the upstream users who are parties 
to this suit would leave the water alone until the stream 
receded to a point where it would not reach the Hubers 
in quantities sufficient to do them any good. The upstream 
users would then take it. This is exactly what the trial 
court found to be the fact. See Finding No.9 (R 54). In 
addition to the testimony of the Appellants in this regard, 
the testimony from the Hubers adequately supports the 
trial court's findings (R. 61-66). 
3. RESPONDENTS ADEQUATELY SHOWED 
THEIR RIGHT TO USE WATER UNDER 
CERTIFICATE NO. 1477. 
Appellants' last objection is raised for the first time 
on appeal, as they admit on page 24 of their brief. The 
certificate of appropriation which gives the complete de-
tail of Respondents' right, is in evidence as Exhibit D. It 
is by statute prima facie evidence of the water right. 
73-3-17, UCA 1953. The water covered by the certificate 
is a primary right (the exclusive water used) on part of 
the land, and is a secondary or supplemental right to the 
balance. The certificate describes by metes and bounds 
the lands on which the right is supplementary and the 
lands as to which the right is primary. Engineer Jones 
prepared an exhibit on a land use map of the Soil Con-
servation District, showing the lands below the White 
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Rocks Ditch and the lands irrigated exclusively from 
Deep Creek (Ex. G). The irrigated acreage is there set 
forth. Neither of the exhibits is contraverted by any tes-
timony of Appellants. The court expressly specified in 
its decree that the water right of Respondents is repre-
sented by Certi:fi.icate No.1477, which does show all of this 
as is indicated above. 
This area is extremely short of water, and without 
irrigation the Huber lands were barren and unproductive. 
Mr. Taylor testified that Gerbers always used all of the 
water they could get and didn't waste any (R. 256). Ap-
pellant Cook admits on cross-examination (R. 182) that 
he has never seen the Hubers permit water to run beyond 
their place, except during the the flood season; that 
Hubers have lived on their ranch at all times since 1929; 
that they have made their living exclusively from their 
farm; that their land is not productiYe without water; 
that it is beneficial for them to divert the water from 
Deep Creek on to the ground, and that he does not know 
of a time when Hubers have let water run to waste, other 
than in extremely high water periods ; that they have 
raised crops on their lands every year (R. 182-4). Appel-
lants, of course, raise no question in the evidence that 
IIubers had too much water for their lands and will never 
try to make such an assertion because it isn't true. l\Ir. 
Justice said (R. 250) that the people in this area haYe 
to use their wnter carefully, in order to make a living. 
Mr. Colton testified that the crops frequently failed for 
lack of water (R. 143). 
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:om We submit that the certificate affirmed by the decree 
s~t amply shows the lands for which the water is primary 
l~s. and the lands for which it is secondary, and that the rec-
~m ord discloses that the water has been and is beneficially 
~~11. being used to the full extent of the decreed right. Appel-
!!t lants should not be heard to contend for the first time on 
t~oul 
~yon~ 
13!11: 
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appeal and without having raised the issue at all in the 
trial court, that there was not a finding of beneficial use. 
The certificate itself made a prima facie case (See Sec. 
73-3-17, 1953), and to the extent the matter was referred 
to by the witnesses it is clear that the water has always 
been used and is necessary to the raising of crops. 
We respectfully submit that the judgment of the 
lower court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
EDWARD W. CLYDE 
Attorney for Plaintiffs and 
Respondents 
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